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Bridging or Bonding? Preferences for Redistribution and Social Capital in Russia1 
Ekaterina Borisova        Andrei Govorun        Denis Ivanov 
 
International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development 
National Research University Higher School of Economics 
 
Does bridging or bonding social capital matter for redistribution preferences? Existing literature 
demonstrates causal link between measures of social capital and such preferences but does it 
mostly for developed countries with good enforcement of formal rules and without a distinction 
between two completely different types of social capital. We argue that welfare state relies on 
contributions from an immense number of anonymous citizens, thus attitudes towards strangers, 
i.e. generalized trust and solidarity should be salient. Using two surveys of about 34,000 and 
37,000 Russians we prove this proposition showing the importance of the bridging type but not 
the bonding one. Instrumenting social capital with education, climate and distance from Moscow 
we deal with endogeneity concerns. Additionally we claim that connection between social capital 
and redistribution preferences for less developed countries such as Russia could be similar to 
developed countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Social preferences for redistribution are crucial for the functioning of modern welfare state. 
However, there is still need to understand which factors make people willing to support the 
system based on taxing the rich and the middle class and transferring resources to the poor. 
Rational utility-maximizing voter models starting from [Meltzer, Richards 1981] imply that 
under universal franchise median voter’s position in the overall income distribution scale dictates 
the tax rate and, therefore, share of income to be redistributed. In a society with large middle 
class popular support for redistribution would be lesser that in a highly unequal society2. Later 
research, however, has proven that this pattern is not universal, and many factors other than pure 
economic self-interest affect preferences for redistribution. Importantly for us, voters may 
oppose redistribution if they are not sure that taxes paid would not be diverted from aiding the 
poor [Rothstein et al. 2012; Svallfors 2012]; or if the middle class members believe that the poor 
are able to escape their poverty without government support if they would work hard enough 
[Gilens 1999; Alesina, Glaeser 2004; Alesina, La Ferrara 2005; Fong et al. 2006]. [Cavaille, 
Trump 2015] summarize this strand of research, talking about “the two facets of social policy 
preferences”: taking from the rich and giving to the poor, which are independently determined.  
Social (generalized) trust allows to solve the problems arising from individuals’ limited 
ability to monitor each other action. The basic idea underlying this hypothesis is that welfare 
                                                          
1 The article was prepared within the framework of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University 
Higher School of Economics (HSE) and supported within the framework of a subsidy by the Russian Academic 
Excellence Project '5-100'. We thank participants in seminars at the National Research University Higher School of 
Economics and Columbia University. 
2 In practice, however, it is necessary to account for the fact that existing income distribution itself is at least 
partially product of government redistribution and public goods provision, thus it is not trivial to establish a causal 
link in this setting. 
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system is a kind of public good depending crucially on collective action and the society’s ability 
to solve free-rider problem successfully. The free-rider problem in this particular setting refers to 
benefiting from the welfare state without contributing to its resources by avoiding taxes, working 
informally while being on welfare, claiming benefits without being legally entitled or otherwise 
abusing the social security system. Thus people would be more likely to support taxation in 
exchange for access to generous redistribution schemes in a case of need if they are confident in 
their peers [Daniele, Geys 2015]. 
In this paper, we test this hypothesis using individual- and regional-level data on social 
capital and preferences for redistribution in Russia. Previously, this relationship was studied 
mostly using data from democratic countries with well-functioning government bureaucracy, like 
OECD member states. Focusing on Russia has certain advantages that constitute an important 
part of the paper’s novelty. Russia has relatively weak tax enforcement, and unconditional 
compliance with tax rates cannot be taken for granted. Also, citizens’ capacity to influence 
government budget allotment and to monitor public spending is limited due to weakness of 
accountability mechanisms. Social trust is particularly salient as a predictor of human behavior 
when formal enforcement of rules is inefficient [Fisman, Miguel 2007; Cassar et al. 2014]. 
Therefore, we should expect that social trust should lead to higher preferences for redistribution 
among Russian respondents.  
We use data from 2007 and 2008 rounds of Georating survey provided by the large and 
well-known public opinion fund FOM3. It’s the best available source of information on 
Russians’ views and preferences, which is representative at the regional level. One important 
pitfall is a lack of questions about trust and other measures of social capital in 2008 and those 
about preferences for redistribution in 2007. We overcome this problem averaging individual 
responses about social capital at the regional level in 2007 and using the resulting vector of 
regional means as an explanatory variable in regressions with 2008 preferences for redistribution 
as a dependent variable4. 
We demonstrate that respondents in regions with high level of generalized trust tend to 
rate a society with low income inequality as being more fair compared to a society whose 
members’ income varies greatly according to individual ability and skills5. This result is robust 
to using different estimation techniques, controlling for a number of individual- and regional-
level socio-demographic, economic and institutional controls. Also, we get pretty similar results 
using perceptions of social solidarity instead of social trust. To deal with causality concerns, we 
instrument social trust and perceptions of solidarity in a region with its January and June 
temperature, distance from regional capital to Moscow and 1989 share of people with college-
level degree. The main results become even stronger in the IV setting.  
In addition, we consider effect of socio-demographic variables used as the controls on 
individual tolerance of inequality (alternatively, on preferences for redistribution). According to 
our expectations, individual income as well as being an entrepreneur increase tolerance of 
inequality, while salaried employees, retirees and unemployed consistently tend to be pro-
redistribution. Having secondary vocational or college-level degree is positively correlated with 
tolerance of inequality. Regional-level variables, including GRP, social spending per capita and 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization index are statistically insignificant, but corruption perception 
has strong negative association with tolerance of inequality. Surprisingly, regional-level Gini 
                                                          
3 http://fom.ru/  
4 To be more precise we get aggregated social capital measures that are purified from individual parameters such as 
age, gender, etc. Details of the procedure explained in section 4. 
5 We are grateful to Daniel Treisman for the notion that this question may be also interpreted as a measure of 
tolerance of inequality. Advantage of using this question is that it does not refer to actual level of redistribution, 
which may differ across regions and thus bias our results.  
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index tends to be positively correlated with tolerance of inequality, which may reflect some kind 
of status quo bias in the respondents’ answers.  
Our results point at bridging social capital as a source of higher preferences for 
redistribution. Also, we obtain no significant results substituting trust and perceptions of 
solidarity with measures of bonding social capital, which is likely to provide non-governmental 
social safety net with the resources of close circle of friends, relatives, ethnic or religious kin. 
Thus we contribute to the theory pointing at significance of bridging type of social capital, not 
bonding one. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the literature on preferences 
for redistribution and specifies our contribution. The third section gives important information on 
inequality and redistribution policy in Russia. Than the three following sections constitute 
empirical part of the paper describing data and empirical strategy and presenting main empirical 
findings with the robustness checks. The last section concludes.  
2. Preferences for redistribution: Theory 
Theoretical literature on preferences for redistribution has been largely built on the 
seminal Meltzer-Richards model of positive relationship between income inequality and median 
voter support for redistributive policies. However, as noted in [Alesina, Guiliano 2009; Olivera 
2015], this hypothesis received mixed empirical support. Therefore, much theoretical and 
empirical effort has been devoted to discovering additional mechanisms that may drive 
relationship in another direction than predicted by the Meltzer-Richards model.   
Expectations of upward mobility are among most common explanations for people’s 
preferences for redistribution other than median voter’s position in the income distribution 
[Piketty 1995; Benabou, Ok 2001; Alesina, La Ferrara 2005]. If people in lower income strata 
are optimistic about their future incomes, they would be less willing to support redistribution 
than predicted by their current income. Conversely, experiencing negative economic shocks 
during childhood make individuals more pro-redistribution, as shown in [Giuliano, Spilimbergo 
2008]. [Gimpelson, Monusova 2014] use a cross-country dataset to demonstrate that perceived 
opportunities for upward social mobility are more important as a determinant of peoples’ 
tolerance of inequality than actual size of the gap between the rich and the poor. Furthermore, 
[Gimpelson, Treisman 2015] demonstrate that respondents in social surveys lack idea of actual 
level of inequality in their countries reported by the official statistics, but perceived level of 
inequality is strong and statistically significant predictor for popular support for redistribution at 
the national level.  
Individual risk-aversion is also among the classic factors generally accepted to influence 
people’s taste for redistribution. More risk-averse individuals could show more pro-redistributive 
preferences [Sinn 1995] as they need social insurance from the welfare state. 
Social beliefs about causes of wealth and poverty also matter: people are less willing to 
put high tax burden on wealth accumulated due to individual effort than on windfall created by 
birth, connections, luck or corruption [Alesina, Angletos, 2005]. [Gimpelson, Monusova 2014] 
find that wide-spread perceptions of non-meritocratic mechanisms like family ties and corruption 
as crucial drivers of success are positively related to preferences for redistribution. [Sabatini et 
al. 2014] show that individual stigmatization of rent-seeking is positively related to preferences 
for redistribution. Also they find that living in an area with lower share of people stigmatizing 
rent-seeking (and thus such behavior being more common) makes people favorable to 
redistribution (however, the latter relationship holds for men only). Similarly, redistribution 
tends to be higher in the societies where people think that poor are unlucky than in those where 
people believe that poor are lazy and immoral [Gilens 1999; Alesina, Glaeser 2004; Alesina, La 
Ferrara 2005]. [Fong et al. 2006] note that fairness and reciprocity considerations are important 
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as foundation of the welfare state, but they also may induce opposition to redistribution because 
of perceived “un-deservingness” of the poor and tendency to support increased screening of 
those who apply for social benefits from the state. [Benabou, Tirole 2006] further develop this 
logic, arguing that parents may inculcate in their children beliefs intentionally exaggerating the 
role of effort in success (just world beliefs) to keep the children motivated.  
Furthermore, ideological indoctrination has been empirically shown to be able to 
transform popular demand for welfare state. [Alesina, Giuliano 2009] point at the robust 
individual-level connection between preferences for redistribution and self-identified political 
ideology: left-wing individuals show greater taste for redistribution in comparison with right-
wing ones. As shown in [Alesina, Fuchs-Schundeln  2007] and [Pop-Eleches, Tucker 2014], 
people who were exposed in their past to communist socialization are more likely to think that 
the state is responsible for individual welfare even when controlled for a number of socio-
demographic variables, including income level. Several papers also show importance of religion: 
more religious people tend to support redistribution less than atheists. For example, [Scheve, 
Stasavage 2006] argue that both religion and welfare state serve as social insurance for adverse 
life events and find empirical support for the substitution mechanism between the two.  
[Marques 2015] offers additional perspective, arguing that under poor institutions 
individuals with comparative advantage in hiding their income from the government, like self-
employed professionals and service workers, are more likely to support redistribution since they 
are eligible to claim benefits while being able to evade taxes. 
Some papers also point at the importance of other individual characteristics. Young and 
old people, women, blacks may prefer more redistribution, while those with higher income and 
better educated are less concerned about it [Alesina, Guiliano 2009]. This evidence is hard to 
explain by only pure economic motives such as the logic in [Meltzer, Richards 1981] and by 
prospects of upward mobility. Pro-redistributive preferences of women are consistent with 
personality features documented by psychologists, and the effect of education could be reversed 
by left-wing indoctrination. 
Recently, researchers have started to focus on social capital as resource enabling the 
society members to favor redistributive policies. [Bergh, Bjornskov 2011] and [Bjornskov, 
Svendsen 2013] examine relationship between social trust and actual size of redistribution. They 
use instrumental variables to conclude that causality runs in the direction from trust to 
redistributive policies, not vice versa, as argued in [Kumlin, Rothstein 2005]6. [Algan et al. 
2016] predict twin peaks relationship between trust and the size and the welfare state due to 
heterogeneous preferences and behavior of high-trust (civic) and low-trust (uncivic) individuals. 
They corroborate predictions from their formal model with the evidence from the OECD 
countries. [Yamamura 2012], using Japanese survey data, demonstrates that “people are more 
likely to express preferences for income redistribution in areas with higher rates of community 
participation”. [Danielle, Geys 2015] on the sample of the OECD countries show that individual 
support to welfare state is influenced by the “citizen’s trust in their fellow citizens”.  
However, as it has been noted above, these studies build on evidence from democratic 
countries with good institutions. This paper aims to address dearth of research on the issue 
outside the developed countries context and to check how social capital in general and social 
trust in particular can bridge the gap in formal enforcement and buttress public support for the 
welfare state. We also aim to show that bridging type of social capital and not the bonding one 
matters for redistribution preferences. Welfare states are based on people most of which don’t 
know each other personally. Thus the bridging type reflecting attitudes towards strangers should 
be salient in this particular setting.   
                                                          
6 [Kumlin, Rothstein 2005] argue that egalitarian social structure and universalistic welfare state institutions like in 
the Nordic countries matter for the production of social capital. 
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3. Inequality and redistribution policy in Russia 
Understanding institutional context within which redistribution system in a given society 
operates is an important part of explaining popular preferences for redistribution. A generous 
welfare state is more likely to raise concerns of free-riding, while neglecting of poverty and 
inequality issues by the government may lead to higher support for redistribution.  
During the post-socialist transition, income inequality in Russia has become tremendous. 
Russia’s Gini index was 41.7 in 20117. The income gap in Russia is wider than in most other 
European countries, including post-socialist nations of Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast to 
many developed countries, in Russia there are also wide income disparities between regions 
[Zubarevich, Safronov 2011].  
At the same time, funding of the Russian welfare system is scarce and insufficient to cope 
with issues of inequality. The Independent Social Policy Institute estimates the share of social 
expenditure of GDP (including health) in 2008 as 12.7 per cent only. Social spending was 
expanded as a share of GDP after the 2008-2009 recession and attained 16.8 per cent in 2013 
[Zubarevich, Gorina 2015: fig. 5]. This level is still significantly lower than OECD average (21.7 
per cent in 2013), although it is higher or comparable to several high- and middle-income OECD 
countries, including Chile, Estonia, Israel, Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Turkey8.  
In addition to inadequate funding, the Russian social welfare system has difficulties in 
targeting resources towards those who are actually in need. According to [Ovcharova, Popova 
2001], the Soviet welfare system had two main objectives: to reward meritorious citizens (such 
as WWII veterans or Chernobyl nuclear disaster responders) and to provide basic social 
insurance like pensions and free healthcare. In the 1990s, this merit-oriented bias of social 
welfare was deepened when the Communist-oriented Duma alongside with regional 
governments introduced dozens of in-kind privileges based on relatively simple, easily-
monitored formal criteria such as being veteran, retiree, disabled person or having many 
children. In 2005, these in-kind privileges were largely replaced with lump sum transfers; 
however, this brought no changes to the overall redistribution pattern. When it comes to 
increasing welfare spending, the government typically chooses to raise pensions. Means-tested 
transfers to the poor accounted for 15-17 percent of social policy spending (excl. health 
expenditures) in late 2000s-early 2010s [Gorina, mimeo].  
Social welfare responsibilities in Russia are shared between the Federation and the 
regional governments, which receive earmarked federal transfers and are also free to contribute 
their own funds to welfare spending. Federal-level social protection is uniform across regions 
although some policies may treat some regions as the northern ones and provide additional 
bonuses to them. Regional-level welfare policies vary across regions. As a result there is a 
significant variation among regions in per capita social spending. In 2011, the minimum was 947 
rubles in Nenetskiy Autonomous Okrug and the maximum was 233,000 rubles in Moscow City.  
To conclude, Russia has relatively modest social spending as percentage of GDP while 
income disparities across social strata as well as between regions are stark. Social spending is not 
targeted to the poor; therefore, the problem of free-riding by welfare recipients is not expected to 
be pressing. However, concerns about fairness of income distribution are likely to influence 
popular preferences for redistribution to a significant degree. 
The above analysis also brings us to conclusions about variables that should be accounted for 
in our model. Now theoretical considerations about the role of inequality for redistribution 
                                                          
7 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html 
8 http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SOCX_AGG 
6 
 
preferences are supported by the empirical evidence. We also see importance of social 
expenditures as their regional variation could influence popular preferences for redistribution. 
Overall we should control for both inequality and social spending although don’t expect them to 
kill the effect of social capital. 
4. Data and empirical strategy 
We investigate the link between social capital and preferences for redistribution employing two 
surveys of about 34,000 and 37,000 individuals in each conducted in Russia by the well-known 
public opinion fund FOM in 2007 and early 2008. Both surveys are designed to be representative 
at regional level and cover the same 68 Russian regions with similar number of observations 
across regions. It’s the best available source of information on the views, norms and attitudes of 
Russians that covers the vast majority of Russian regions. However the limitation of these 
surveys is that there are no questions about social capital in 2008 and about preferences for 
redistribution in 2007. We overcome it by obtaining aggregated for the Russian regions social 
capital variables and using them with the individual-level preferences for redistribution.  
Summary statistics of the variables presented in Tables A2 and A3 of the Appendix. 
Our dependent variable about preferences for redistribution is based on the responses to 
the question from 2008 survey: “In your opinion, what type of society is more fair: where 
people’s incomes are similar or where incomes are appreciably different?” with a scale from 1 to 
4 where higher values correspond to preferences for more unequal society. These response 
options and the distribution of answers presented in Table 1. We transform four-point categorical 
variable to a binary one indicating those who gave preference to society with appreciably 
different incomes rather than society with similar incomes (see Table 1). That 
Tolerance_inequality dummy is our main dependent variable, however we try original four-point 
variable as well to test the robustness of our findings. 
Table 1 
In your opinion, what type of society is more fair: where people’s incomes are 
similar or where incomes are appreciably different? 
Response options 
Response 
rate 
Dependent variable: 
Tolerance_inequality 
1. Certainly the society where incomes are 
similar 
16.7% 
0 
2. Rather the society where incomes are similar 28.2% 
3. Rather the society where incomes are 
appreciably different 
24.8% 
1 
4. Certainly the society where incomes are 
appreciably different 
14.1% 
5. Don’t know 16.2% Missing 
 
Four measures of regional social capital obtained from 2007 survey are used as our 
independent variables of interest. We start with a generalised trust which in our particular setting 
characterizes perceptions of free-riding that abuses social security system. The corresponding 
question in 2007 survey has a traditional wording, used, for example, in World Values Survey: 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very 
careful in dealing with people?”. The two response options “Most people can be trusted” and 
“Need to be very careful” were coded as 1 and 0 respectively. It’s noteworthy that generalized 
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trust serves as a proxy for bridging social capital which we expect to be salient for preferences 
for redistribution.  
Another bridging social capital measure is solidarity which is quite similar to generalized 
trust when we talk about attitudes to social security system abuse. Finally, we use two measures 
of bonding social capital, namely particularized trust and helpfulness, to check whether our 
predictions about importance of bridging social capital are true. Details for the measures of 
social capital could be found in Table 2 below and Table A3 of the Appendix. 
 
Table 2 
Social capital measures 
Variable Question wording Response options 
Generalized 
trust 
Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be 
trusted or that you need to be 
very careful in dealing with 
people? 
1. Most people can be trusted 
2. Need to be very careful 
3. Don’t know 
Solidarity 
Do you think that there is more 
solidarity and cohesion among 
people in our country today, or 
that there is more disagreement 
and disunion? 
1. Certainly more solidarity and cohesion 
2. Somewhat more solidarity and cohesion 
3. Somewhat more disagreement and 
disunion 
4. Certainly more disagreement and 
disunion 
5. Don’t know 
Particularized 
trust 
Do you trust people who have 
much to do with you more than 
other people, or you trust them 
less or equally with others? 
1. Certainly more 
2. Somewhat more 
3. Equally 
4. Somewhat less 
5. Certainly less 
6. Don’t know 
Helpfulness 
How often do you see readiness 
to help each other among people 
around you? 
1. Very often 
2. Quite often 
3. Quite seldom 
4. Very seldom 
5. Never 
6. Don’t know 
 
 
We run the following baseline OLS-model:  
𝑇𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑗 + 𝛾𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛿𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗 +
𝜀𝑖𝑗    (1) 
where 𝑇𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 is a dummy indicating preferences of a respondent  from region 
, 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑗 represents estimation of one of four social capital characteristics for region 
. The term  includes individual control variables that according to the 
literature could influence preferences for redistribution and that were available from 2008 
survey: gender, age, age squared, income, education, occupation and settlement status. 
 denotes a set of regional control variables derived from the theory and 
i
j j
ijIndividualControls
jRegionalControls
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Russian evidence and obtained from official statistics and agencies which provide institutional 
quality indicators for Russian regions (INDEM foundation and Moscow Carnegie Center). Thus 
we control for wealth (logarithm of GRP per capita), inequality (Gini coefficient or share of 
people with incomes below subsistence level instead), fractionalization (ethnic fractionalization 
index), existing level of social support in a region (logarithm of government social expenditures), 
and institutional quality (corruption index). Description of regional controls presented in Table 
A1, while summary statistics provided in Table A3, both in the Appendix. 
𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑗 is for the other year than 𝑇𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 and thus we can’t 
include individual-level control variables for social capital in the baseline regression9. To avoid 
noisy assessments of social capital we run a set of the following OLS-regressions on the 2007 
dataset:  
𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝛼𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛾𝐴𝑔𝑒2 + 𝛿𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜙𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝜂𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝜆𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝜇𝑅𝑒𝑔_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀                                                                              (2) 
The dependent variable 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 is substituted by one of four characteristics of 
social capital: generalised trust, solidarity, particularized trust or helpfulness. A set of regional 
fixed effects 𝑅𝑒𝑔_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 captures cross-regional differences in social capital purified from 
personal characteristics of respondents10. We use them further in our base model (1) as proxies 
for regional social capital. We also utilize simple regional means of social capital to illustrate the 
robustness of our findings.  
5. Results 
Generalized trust matters both statistically and economically suggesting that people living in 
regions with higher levels of generalized trust have lower tolerance of inequality (Table 3). The 
results are robust for the set of individual and regional control variables, alternative four-point 
scale measure of tolerance of inequality, and for simple regional means of trust measures. The 
magnitude of trust effect is almost twice as large as the effect of gender, comparable to the effect 
of Gini coefficient and just a little smaller than the effect of unemployment and high income. 
This provides us with a link to previous research by [Algan et al. 2016], where there is a positive 
and economically significant influence of trust on preferences for redistribution. 
Table 3 
Tolerance of inequality and social capital: OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bridging social capital 
Generalized trust 
-0.696*** 
[0.197]    
Solidarity 
-0.557*** 
[0.192]    
Bonding social capital 
Particularized trust 
-0.008 
[0.111]    
Helpfulness 
0.161 
[0.191]       
Gender: female 
-0.040*** 
[0.007] 
-0.040*** 
[0.007] 
-0.040*** 
[0.007] 
-0.040*** 
[0.007] 
Age 
0.030** 
[0.012] 
0.032*** 
[0.012] 
0.031** 
[0.012] 
0.031** 
[0.012] 
                                                          
9 See [Alesina, La Ferrara 2002] for the influence of individual parameters such as income or education on social 
capital.  
10 Overall strategy of getting pure trust is similar to that used by [Algan, Cahuc 2010]. 
9 
 
Age squared 
  
-0.0061*** 
[0.0013] 
-0.0062*** 
[0.0014] 
-0.0062*** 
[0.0013] 
-0.0062*** 
[0.0013] 
Education: primary professional 
0.031* 
[0.018] 
0.030 
[0.018] 
0.027 
[0.018] 
0.027 
[0.018] 
Education: secondary general 
0.021 
[0.013] 
0.022 
[0.013] 
0.019 
[0.013] 
0.019 
[0.013] 
Education: secondary professional 
0.063*** 
[0.014] 
0.062*** 
[0.014] 
0.061*** 
[0.014] 
0.061*** 
[0.014] 
Education: uncompleted higher, higher 
/ PhD 
 
0.116*** 
[0.016] 
0.115*** 
[0.016] 
0.115*** 
[0.016] 
0.115*** 
[0.016] 
Type of employment: department 
manager 
-0.037* 
[0.020] 
-0.038* 
[0.020] 
-0.036* 
[0.020] 
-0.036* 
[0.020] 
Type of employment: specialist, 
master 
-0.075*** 
[0.016] 
-0.077*** 
[0.016] 
-0.077*** 
[0.016] 
-0.078*** 
[0.016] 
Type of employment: white collar 
worker 
-0.104*** 
[0.018] 
-0.106*** 
[0.018] 
-0.109*** 
[0.018] 
-0.111*** 
[0.018] 
Type of employment: blue collar 
worker 
-0.092*** 
[0.017] 
-0.093*** 
[0.017] 
-0.089*** 
[0.0167] 
-0.090*** 
[0.0166] 
Type of employment: (not working) 
retired 
-0.101*** 
[0.018] 
-0.100*** 
[0.018] 
-0.098*** 
[0.019] 
-0.099*** 
[0.019] 
Type of employment: housewife (do 
not work and do not plan to look for 
job) 
-0.083*** 
[0.023] 
-0.083*** 
[0.023] 
-0.079*** 
[0.023] 
-0.079*** 
[0.023] 
Type of employment: unemployed or 
on holidays without pay 
-0.102*** 
[0.021] 
-0.101*** 
[0.021] 
-0.098*** 
[0.022] 
-0.099*** 
[0.022] 
Type of employment: student 
-0.086*** 
[0.020] 
-0.087*** 
[0.020] 
-0.085*** 
[0.021] 
-0.085*** 
[0.021] 
Type of employment: other 
-0.130*** 
[0.035] 
-0.132*** 
[0.035] 
-0.133*** 
[0.035] 
-0.134*** 
[0.035] 
Income category: having enough 
money for food, but not enough for 
clothes, shoes 
0.042*** 
[0.013] 
0.045*** 
[0.014] 
0.043*** 
[0.014] 
0.043*** 
[0.014] 
Income category: having enough 
money for clothes and shoes, but not 
enough for home appliances 
0.084*** 
[0.016] 
0.087*** 
[0.016] 
0.083*** 
[0.017] 
0.083*** 
[0.017] 
Income category: having enough 
money for home appliances, but not 
enough for a car 
0.158*** 
[0.020] 
0.160*** 
[0.020] 
0.155*** 
[0.021] 
0.154*** 
[0.021] 
Income category: having enough 
money for a car or for an apartment, 
house 
  
0.181*** 
[0.019] 
0.184*** 
[0.019] 
0.180*** 
[0.020] 
0.179*** 
[0.020] 
Settlement: Moscow 
0.087 
[0.057] 
0.067 
[0.061] 
0.099 
[0.066] 
0.092 
[0.061] 
Settlement: Saint Petersburg 
0.010 
[0.034] 
0.013 
[0.036] 
-0.004 
[0.038] 
-0.025 
[0.043] 
Settlement: regional capital 
(population<= 1 mln) 
0.043 
[0.041] 
0.034 
[0.0417] 
0.0293 
[0.0422] 
0.0266 
[0.0413] 
Settlement: provincial town 
0.037 
[0.041] 
0.028 
[0.041] 
0.027 
[0.041] 
0.024 
[0.040] 
Settlement: village -0.011 -0.020 -0.020 -0.022 
10 
 
  [0.040] [0.041] [0.041] [0.040] 
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization  
0.040 
[0.077] 
0.086 
[0.077] 
0.049 
[0.080] 
0.028 
[0.086] 
Corruption  
-0.042*** 
[0.014] 
-0.039*** 
[0.014] 
-0.051*** 
[0.015] 
-0.050*** 
[0.015] 
Log GRP per capita 
-0.111 
[0.077] 
-0.090 
[0.084] 
-0.138 
[0.088] 
-0.16 
[0.094] 
Log Social spending per capita 
-0.0005 
[0.058] 
0.002 
[0.054] 
0.027 
[0.059] 
0.035 
[0.059] 
Gini 
  
0.992** 
[0.428] 
0.876* 
[0.470] 
0.917* 
[0.504] 
0.914* 
[0.502] 
Constant 
0.398* 
[0.221] 
0.464* 
[0.236] 
0.302 
[0.274] 
0.252 
[0.232] 
Observations 31,068 31,068 31,068 31,068 
R-squared 0.069 0.068 0.064 0.065 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Base categories:  
Education: primary general or less;  
Type of employment: businessmen, entrepreneur, farmer, top manager;  
Income category: having not enough money even for food;  
Settlement: regional capital (population> 1 mln). 
Solidarity, i.e. feeling of unity among people that are connected to expectations of low 
levels of abuse of the social system, further strengthens our results. It also demonstrates negative 
sign of the connection with tolerance of inequality, thus serving as a good robust check for our 
theoretical predictions with another measure for bridging social capital. 
Finally, we use measures of bonding social capital as a placebo test. According to our 
theory individual attitudes towards strangers, i.e. generalized trust and solidarity should 
influence the preferences for redistribution. At the same time, we do not expect to find the same 
effect for one’s close circle because the welfare state relies on contributions from an immense 
number of anonymous citizens which by default do not know individual benefit claimants. We 
successfully find that our two measures of bonding social capital, namely particularized trust and 
helpfulness, are not related to tolerance of inequality.   
In addition we see that more redistribution is preferred by younger and older persons, 
unemployed, females, people with lower levels of education and income. All this is in line with 
previous findings. Notably, entrepreneurs have less desire to redistribute which talks to the 
literature on risk-aversion and role of personal effort vs. sudden luck. We also see that those 
living in regions with higher inequality prefer less redistribution which can be seen as yet 
another example of the failure of the Meltzer-Richards model to explain redistribution 
preferences.  
What is remarkable is that more corrupt regions are positively associated with 
preferences to redistribute. Moreover, result is robust to several alternative measures of 
corruption11 (see Table 4). As shown in [Aghion et al. 2010], even if people think that 
government is corrupt they could be more supporting government intervention into economy 
because of their lack of trust in business. The same possibility of a positive link between 
corruption and preferences for redistribution is demonstrated by the theoretical model in 
[Alesina, Angeletos 2005]. Redistribution thus perceived as an equalizer of outcomes created by 
                                                          
11 Although both Corruption index and Willingness to bribe assess regional corruption in 2010 we believe they may 
be used as measures of corruption for 2008, because this institution is unlikely to evolve rapidly. Nevertheless, in 
our main specification we give preferences to corruption assessment provided in 2004. 
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unfairness. Alternatively, prevalence of uncivic individuals interested in free-riding could have 
such an outcome [Algan et al. 2016]. 
Table 4 
Corruption and preferences for redistribution 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Corruption  
-0.042*** 
[0.014] 
  
  
Corruption index (by INDEM)  
-0.162** 
[0.069] 
 
  
Willingness to bribe (by INDEM)   
-0.342*** 
[0.119] 
  
Generalized trust 
-0.777*** 
[0.185] 
-0.696*** 
[0.197] 
-0.808*** 
[0.196] 
Individual controls YES YES YES 
Regional controls YES YES YES 
Constant 
0.398* 
[0.221] 
0.410* 
[0.214] 
0.400* 
[0.206] 
Observations 31,068 31,068 31,068 
R-squared 0.069 0.068 0.069 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
6. Endogeneity concerns 
Endogeneity of the main explanatory variable is a potential challenge to our identification 
strategy. If social trust is somehow influenced by tolerance of inequality (reverse causality), or 
co-determined with it by any third factor (omitted variable), the OLS estimates are inconsistent. 
We can also expect errors in the measurement of social capital and preferences for redistribution 
which lead to the same inconsistency. Reverse causality is possibly the least of the problems as 
regional levels of social capital reflect the overall atmosphere and not individual feelings. 
Anyway to deal with potentially biased OLS-estimates cautiously, we implement 2SLS 
approach. 
We instrument social capital in the regions with four instrumental variables. Following 
[Bergh, Bjornskov 2011], we use average temperature in January and July. Traditional argument 
is that in colder climates individual survival historically depended more on cooperation with 
strangers, thus predicting negative first-stage relationship. At the same time, in Russia with its 
tradition of communal agriculture this channel of influence seems to be less relevant. Moreover, 
in southern and warmer areas of Russia communal agriculture was even more important for 
survival than in northern and colder ones due to lack of other valuable resources that can be 
extracted by smaller groups of people, like wood or fur skins. These resources are also 
contestable and lootable, thus making profitable for an individual to be tough and suspicious to 
strangers (in a manner similar to “culture of honor” formation in lawless herder societies, as 
tested empirically in [Grosjean 2014]). Therefore, we can expect either negative or positive sign 
of the first-stage relationship. 
As additional two instruments we use share of inhabitants having college-level degrees in 
1989 and distance to Moscow. 1989 share of college graduates is a proxy for historic social 
capital, since it has been shown that social capital is important enabler of human capital 
formation (Coleman, 1988). We expect it to be positively related to social capital. Distance to 
Moscow is a proxy for state capacity and intensity of state control [Foa, Nemirovskaya 2016]. 
Given centralized and, for the most of Russian history, authoritarian nature of the state, it is more 
likely that heavy government involvement in life is likely to crowd out social capital, as outlined 
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in [Putnam et al. 1993]. We expect positive relationship between distance and social capital 
measures. Description and summary statistics for the instruments presented in Tables A1 and A3 
of the Appendix. 
The results from the first-stage regressions (Table 5) are generally in line with our 
expectations. January average temperature is positively related to solidarity, thus favoring the 
second of possible explanations. 1989 share of college graduates and logarithm of distance to 
Moscow are also positively related to trust. Interestingly, our instrumental variables do not 
predict indicators of bonding social capital, i.e. particularized trust and expectations of aid from 
one’s close circle. 
Table 5 
IV first step 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Generalized 
trust 
Solidarity 
Particularized 
trust 
Helpfulness 
Temperature in 
January 
0.002 
[0.001] 
0.003** 
[0.001] 
-0.002 
[0.003] 
-0.0005 
[0.0012] 
Temperature in July 
-0.004 
[0.003] 
-0.008* 
[0.004] 
-0.001 
[0.005] 
-0.004 
[0.004] 
Higher education 
0.011*** 
[0.003] 
0.008** 
[0.003] 
-0.005 
[0.005] 
0.009** 
[0.004] 
Log distance to 
Moscow 
0.036*** 
[0.013] 
0.051*** 
[0.012] 
-0.028 
[0.022] 
-0.005 
[0.009] 
Individual controls YES YES YES YES 
Regional controls YES YES YES YES 
Constant 
0.126 
[0.090] 
0.321*** 
[0.095] 
0.930*** 
[0.190] 
0.311*** 
[0.106] 
Observations 31,068 31,068 31,068 31,068 
R-squared 0.377 0.458 0.107 0.422 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Overall IV regressions provide even stronger results than OLS (Table 6). Coefficients for 
generalized trust and solidarity are 1.5 times larger than obtained with the OLS-model. Thus we 
can claim even more economically significant effect of bridging social capital on preferences for 
redistribution. One can also note that helpfulness becomes significant with the same direction of 
effect as bridging social capital measures. But recall the above mentioned first-stage results that 
demonstrate weak ability of the instruments to predict bonding social capital measures. Thus we 
can’t interpret this result properly. 
Table 6 
Tolerance of inequality and social capital: IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bridging social capital 
Generalized trust 
-1.013*** 
[0.379]    
Solidarity 
-0.883*** 
[0.329]    
Bonding social capital 
Particularized trust 
1.334 
[1.276]    
Helpfulness -1.071* 
   
13 
 
[0.612] 
Individual controls YES YES YES YES 
Regional controls YES YES YES YES 
Constant 
0.444** 
[0.226] 
0.563** 
[0.248] 
-0.860 
[1.043] 
0.585* 
[0.334] 
Observations 31,068 31,068 31,068 31,068 
R-squared 0.068 0.067 0.029 0.049 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Controls for individuals’ background and characteristics of regions are the same as in Table 2.  
 
7. Conclusion  
Preferences for redistribution are driven by a large set of factors representing individual 
characteristics, experience and region or country of residence. Social capital is among the factors 
that were recognized only recently. Its ability to solve free-riding problems was demonstrated in 
a number of papers. However, evidence remains mostly for developed countries with good 
institutions. Moreover there is no distinction between two completely different types of social 
capital – bridging and bonding ones. First of them reflects attitudes to unknown people, while 
second serves to capture perceptions about quite narrow circle of people who the respondent 
knows. We expect that given the nature of a welfare state only bridging social capital should be 
prominent. 
 Using unique surveys of about 35,000 individuals in the vast majority of Russian regions 
we study the effect of bridging and bonding social capital for the preferences for redistribution. 
In doing so we measure preferences for redistribution with the attitudes to the fairness of 
inequality. An important advantage of this question is that it doesn’t refer to actual level of 
redistribution that may differ across regions and thus bias results. We find that individuals living 
in regions with higher generalized trust and solidarity tend to rate unequal society as unfair. On 
the contrary we don’t find the same effect for particularized trust and helpfulness which are 
employed as measures of bonding social capital. Results are robust to different controls and 
measurement techniques and become even stronger in IV-model with the instruments for 
education, climate, and distance from Moscow. 
  We also find that some individual parameters such as age, gender, education, income, 
unemployment, being an entrepreneur matter for redistribution preferences. This is in line with 
previous research that was however mostly for developed countries. Thus interregional variation 
of preferences for redistributive policy in developing country could have the same determinants 
as in developed countries.  
What is even more interesting that according to our findings and consistent with 
theoretical predictions from the literature, corruption leads to more demand for redistribution, 
possibly because redistribution is believed to correct unfairness created by potentials for free-
riding in corrupt environment. For our particular setting this means that preferences for 
redistribution would be the highest in regions with high social capital and widespread corruption. 
How this could be the case? Perhaps because of the vicious circle created by the influence of 
social capital on redistribution which in turn leads to more corruption and then to more 
redistribution. This puzzle should be accounted for in the reform agenda and provides an 
interesting topic for future research.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. Regional control variables: description and sources 
Variable name Year Variable description Data source 
Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization 
2010 
Herfindahl—Hirschman index based on ethnic groups’ shares 
to measure ethnic diversity within regions. Higher values of 
variable indicate more fractionalization. 
2010 Russian census 
Log GRP per capita  2007 
Logarithm of gross regional product per capita, adjusted for 
regional cost of living with regional average price for fixed 
commodity bundle, number of commodity bundles per year. 
Rosstat database 
Log social spending per 
capita 
2007 
Logarithm of regional and local authorities’ spending per 
capita on social welfare, adjusted for regional cost of living 
with regional average price for fixed commodity bundle, 
number of commodity bundles per year. 
Russian Treasury database 
Gini 2007 Gini coefficient indicating income inequality within regions. Rosstat database 
Poverty 2007 
Percentage of people with level of income below subsistence 
level. 
Rosstat database 
Corruption  2004 
Experts’ assessments based corruption index; it’s a component 
of regional democracy index provided by Moscow Carnegie 
Center. Higher values of variable indicate more corruption. 
Moscow Carnegie Center 
Corruption index (by 
INDEM) 
2010 
Survey based regional corruption index provided by INDEM 
foundation and Public Opinion Fund. Higher values of 
variable indicate more corruption. 
INDEM foundation report to 
Ministry of Economic 
Development of Russia 
Willingness to bribe (by 
INDEM) 
2010 
Survey based assessment of people’s willingness to offer 
bribes; it’s a component of regional corruption index provided 
by INDEM foundation and Public Opinion Fund. Higher 
values of variable indicate more corruption. 
INDEM foundation report to 
Ministry of Economic 
Development of Russia 
Log distance to Moscow  Logarithm of distance from Moscow to regional capitals. Rosstat database 
Temperature in January 2007 Average temperature in January (°C). Rosstat database 
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Variable name Year Variable description Data source 
Temperature in July 2007 Average temperature in July (°C). Rosstat database 
Higher education  1989 
Percentage of population aged 15 and above with higher 
education. 
1989 Soviet census 
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Table A2. Summary statistics for variables at the individual level 
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Tolerance of inequality 31209 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Gender: female 37263 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Age 37263 44.2 16.8 18 95 
Education: primary general or less 37217 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Education: primary professional 37217 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Education: secondary general 37217 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Education: secondary special 37217 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Education: uncompleted higher, higher / PhD 37217 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Type of employment: businessmen, entrepreneur, top 
manager 
37103 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Type of employment: department manager 37103 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Type of employment: specialist 37103 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Type of employment: white collar worker 37103 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Type of employment: blue collar worker 37103 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Type of employment: (not working) retired 37103 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Type of employment: housewife (do not work and do not 
plan to look for job) 
37103 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Type of employment: unemployed or on holidays without 
pay 
37103 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Type of employment: student 37103 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Type of employment: other 37103 0.01 0.12 0 1 
Income category: having not enough money even for food 37256 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Income category: having enough money for food, but not 
enough for clothes, shoes 
37256 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Income category: having enough money for clothes and 
shoes, but not enough for home appliances 
37256 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Income category: having enough money for home 
appliances, but not enough for a car 
37256 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Income category: having enough money for a car or an 37256 0.07 0.25 0 1 
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apartment/house 
Type of settlement: Moscow  37263 0.01 0.12 0 1 
Type of settlement: Saint Petersburg 37263 0.01 0.12 0 1 
Type of settlement: regional capital with population above 
1 mln 
37263 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Type of settlement: regional capital with population below 
1 mln 
37263 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Type of settlement: provincial town  37263 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Type of settlement: village 37263 0.25 0.43 0 1 
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Table A3. Summary statistics for regional variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Generalized trust 68 0.15 0.05 0.07 0.33 
Solidarity  68 0.32 0.06 0.22 0.53 
Particularized trust 68 0.69 0.07 0.44 0.86 
Helpfulness 68 0.28 0.06 0.14 0.41 
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization 68 0.28 0.15 0.10 0.73 
Log GRP per capita  68 1.38 0.17 1.10 2.15 
Log Social spending per capita 68 3.70 0.36 2.82 4.99 
Gini 68 0.39 0.03 0.34 0.55 
Poverty 68 16.6 4.7 7.4 31.6 
Corruption  68 3.16 0.66 1 4 
Corruption index (by INDEM) 68 0.45 0.15 0.15 0.81 
Willingness to bribe (by INDEM) 68 0.47 0.08 0.27 0.70 
Log distance to Moscow 68 2.99 0.70 0 4.07 
Temperature in January 68 -13.5 5.7 -28.8 -0.1 
Temperature in July 68 18.1 2.3 11.8 25.3 
Higher education  68 10.1 3.0 7.2 26.4 
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